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[2] an appeal is 
IJn'b"u"''u on the clerk's and certain exhibits, and 
error is claimed to appear on face of the record, in the 
absence of to the record it will be pre-
sumed that contains all matters material to a determination 
of the on Appeal, rule 52.) 
[3a, 3b] Architects- Who May Practice Architecture.-17 Cal. 
architectural plans and specifica-
additions, alterations or repair of 
Admin. § 
to be prepared by a licensed 
'"''~w"'"'• is a valid administrative 
to practice in another 
plans, drawings and specifica-
UWALv.cva without first obtaining a license 
& Prof. Code, §§ 5550, 5551), 
or a certificate. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 5540.) 
[4a, 4b] Id.-Certificates.-Where a contract for architectural ser-
vices that though defendant "is not an architect" he 
could, because of his education, training and experience, pre-
pare and specifications for a hospital addition 
was measure of his he could not be re-
quired to obtain an architect's license or a temporary certifi-
cate. 
[5] 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, 
[5] See Cal.Jnr.2d, vv'-'"""' 
:UicK. Dig. References: 
Error, § 1105.1 6-10] 
Performance.-Where a con-
mode of performance, but 
be assumed that the parties 
Contracts, § 153. 
3; [2] Appeal and 
Contracts, § 40. 
Feb. 755 
plaintiff's fl"""'''"' 
!d.-Certificates.-Where a contract for architectural services 
not authorized to u"'"'5·'~"" 
to a third party under the 
of other individuals" the >w.on''"gti 
:fications defendant 
a licensed architect, would 
17 Cal. Admin. Code, § 







[8] Id.-Certi.ficates.-The purpose of Health & Saf. Code, § 1411, 
authorizing the State Department of Public Health to make 
reasonable rules and with to hospitals, was 
to enable the for the 
safety and the require-
ment of 17 Cal. buildings 
be designed by by the 
certification of State Architectural Examiners 
is reasonably related to of that purpose. 
[9] Id.-Certi:licates.-17 Cal. Admin. Code, § 406, requiring archi-
tectural plans and for a hospital addition to be 
prepared by a licensed architect or civil 
does not conflict with Bus. & Prof. § 5537, excepting 
from the general of the code those persons 
who, on written disclosure the fact that they are unlicensed, 
seek to provide architectural since § 5537 does not 
confer on ali persons for all purposes the right to design 
buildings. 
[10] !d.-Certificates.-Where a contract for architectural services 
in connection with plans and for a 
hospital addition in violation of 17 
Cal. Admin. that such plans and speci-
fications be prepared by architect or registered civil 
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APPEAL from a 
Angeles County. Donald E. 
versed. 
Court of Los 
pro tern.• Re-
Action for for breach of a contract to render 
architectural services. for reversed. 
Louis M. Welsh and David H. 
Morrow & Morrow and John C. Morrow for Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal on the roll from 
a judgment for the plaintiff in an action to recover damages 
for the breach of a contract to render architectural services 
in connection with the construction of an addition to a 
hospital. 
The defendant is an architect licensed to practice in the 
State of Nebraska. He is not licensed in the State of Cali-
fornia, nor does he hold a temporary certificate to act as an 
architect in this state. In April 1954 the plaintiff and the 
defendant signed a contract dated January 2, 1954. The 
contract provides in part as follows: 
". . . Chalmers is not an architect [licensed to practice 
in California] ... Chalmers, because of his education, train-
ing and experience, can prepare for Owner plans, drawings 
and specifications for said hospital addition and is willing 
to assist Owner in the construction and finishing of said 
building and . . . Owner desires to employ Chalmers for the 
period of time necessary to complete such work . . . the 
parties hereto agree as follows : 
"1. That Chalmers shall be employed by Owner and shall: 
"A. Prepare for Owner plaus, drawings and specifications 
for said building including preliminary plans, final and work-
ing drawings and specifications with the require-
ments and regulations of the California State Department of 
Public Health, the California State Fire Marshal, the United 
States Department of Public Health and United States Civil 
Defense Administration including such large seale and full 
sized detailed drawings for architectural, structural, plumb-
*Assigned by Chairman of J udieia.l Council 
other mechanical work and engineering 
as are necessary for purposes of construction. 
"B. Obtain the of said final and working draw-
and of any of the aforesaid when-
''C. Assist 
tractor. 
be to obtain financing of the 
the services of a general con-
"D. construction ..•• 
"E. bills for costs of construction ...• 
'' 2. That Owner shall pay to Chalmers as salary the sum 
of Seven Hundred Dollars ... a month for each month 
from February 1954 .... 
"4. That for the erection of said building 
shall be completed on or before May 1, 1954, and final working 
drawings and specifications shall be completed and twelve 
. . . copies of the same submitted to Owner on or before 
September 1, 1954. 
"5. That Chalmers may obtain the assistance of other indi-
viduals to assist him in his work hereunder but they shall 
not be employees of Owner and Owner shall be under no 
obligation to compensate such individuals or to reimburse 
Chalmers for such expenses as may be incurred by him in 
connection therewith. . . . 
"9. That this shall constitute the entire con-
tract with to this matter." 
The defendant began work in February 1954. He prepared 
some which were found by the trial 
court to be incomplete, not in accordance with the agreement, 
and of no value to the The defendant did not com-
plete any of the final or drawings, plans, or specifica-
tions as required by the contract. 
In October 1954 the defendant repudiated the contract on 
the ground that by him was illegal because he 
was not licensed to architecture in California. 
The trial court found the defendant, denied him 
relief on his and rendered judgment for the 
plaintiff for $13,075 of which $6,375 was for salary thereto-
fore paid by the to the defendant and $6,700 of 
which was for the difference between the salary to which 
Chalmers was entitled under the contract and the fee paid 
to the architect who undertook to design and construct the 
building repudiation. 
for new con-
of any buildings to 
as defined in 'l'itle 17, 
shall be submitted to 
Health for review and ap-
of construction. . . . 
shall be prepared by a duly 
licensed architect or civil 
'' (c) Plans shall be submitted in two 
conclusion of law: "Said 
written agreement was not or unlawful in any par-
ticular, either at the time it was executed or thereafter, nor 
was the thereof either party thereto illegal, 
Said written was not void 
thereto." 
contention that the findings of fact 
of the contract and 
recite the above Administrative Code 
do not that conclusion. 
[2] It should be noted that the is presented on the 
clerk's and certain exhibitR. The error is claimed 
to appear on the face of the record. in the absence of 
to the it will be presumed that 
it contains all matters material to a determination of the 
on Rules on ; see also 3 Wit-
kin. California 2239-2243.) 
If section 406 is a valid administrative regulation, it 
is clear that Chalmers could not have rendered a lawful 
without first a Hcense (Bus. & Prof. 
5551), certificate & Prof. 
contends that an obliga-
tion to obtain a license was upon the defendant by 
the contract. The contract contains two recitals relevant to 
Feb. 
the determination 
"is not an architect." 
mers, because of his "'"'u."'"'Hvu, 
prepare for Owner 
addition ... 
practice architecture in this 
measure of the defendant's 
cannot be to obtain an 
rary certificate. It is 
defendant could have 
no 
If the contract is the sole 
it is clear that he 
license or a tempo-
that because the 
first 
obtaining a temporary certificate or a license to practice 
architecture, he was not from a lawful 
performance by section 406. It is a familiar rule that 
where a contract does not mode of 
performance, but may be it will be 
assumed that the contracted for a lawful performance. 
(Burne v. Lee, 156 Cal. 221 [104 P. v. Brown, 
63 Cal.App.2d 504 P.2d .) The present 
contract is not, however, of that nature. lt recites that it 
contains the vvhole 
performance 
would impose upon the which he did 
not assume under the contraet. it heen intended that 
the defendant should obtain it would have been no 
task to have so The finding that 
before entering into the the defendant orally in-
formed the plaintiff that he intended to obtain a license does 
not affect that conclusion. The to be a 
complete integration and the of fact are silent as to 
what effect, if any, such a statement could have had upon the 
present contract. the that the contract was 
drawn by the plaintiff's tends to support the con-
struction which is now upon it. (See Thomas v. Hunt 
MffJ. Corp., 42 Cal.2d 739 [269 P.2d 12).) 
[7] The plaintiff urges that beeause the contract author-
ized the defendant to ". . . obtain the assistance of other 
individuals to assist him in his work .... " Chalmers could 
760 
have 
preparation of Chalmers person-
ally, but with the assistance a licensed would have 
met the of section 406 that and specifica-
tions be prepared by a '' licensed architect. 
The plaintiff contends that section 406 is not a valid regu-
lation, that it is not related to any statutory 
purpose, and that it conflicts with section 5537 of the Busi-
ness and Professions Code. 
[3b, 8] Section 1411 of the Health and Safety Code pro-
vides: '' 'rhe State department ... shall make ... reason-
able rules and regulations to carry ont the purpose of this 
chapter, classifying hospitals and preseribing minimum 
standards of safety and sanitation in the physical plant, of 
diagnostic, therapeutic and laboratory facilities and equip-
ment ... of hospitals." The purpose of that section was to 
enable the Department of Public Health to make rules pro-
viding for the safety and sanitation of hospital buildings. It 
is clear that the requirement of section 406 that hospital 
buildings be designed by persons of proved ability as evi-
denced by the certification of the State Board of Architec-
tural Examiners is reasonably related to accomplishment of 
that purpose. 
[9] Nor is the contention that the regulation conflicts with 
section 5537 of the Business and Professions Code meritorious. 
That section provides: ''This chapter doPs not prevent any 
person from making any or for his own build-
ings or from furnishing to other persons, plans, drawings, 
specifications, instruments of service, or other data for build-
ings, if, prior to accepting employment or commencing work 
on such plans, drawings, specifications, instruments of service, 
or other data, the person, so furnishing such plans, drawings, 
specifications, instruments of service, or data, fully informs 
such other person or persons, in writing, that he ... is not 
an architect." The obvious purpose of that section is to except 
from the general licensing provisions of the code those per-
sons who, upon written disclosure of the fact that they are 
unlicensed, seek to provide architectural services. It does not 
confer upon all persons for all purposes the right to design 
buildings in this state. 
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13] 
Section 1417 of the Health and Safety Code provides: ''Any 
person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter or 
of the rules and regulations promulgated under this chapter 
is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall 
be punished a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars . . . 
or by in the county for a not to 
exceed 180 or both such fine and '' 
[10] As section 406 the Administrative Code was 
adopted pursuant to section 1411 of that chapter. In view 
of the fact that the contract required a performance in viola-
tion of section 406 such conduct would have been punishable 
under section 1417. Recovery under the facts of this case 
would give effect to an unlawful The defendant was 
therefore justified in refusing to proceed further under the 
contract. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and 
McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree with the majority that the contract involved 
here is illegal on the ground that it violates section 406, title 
17, of the California Administrative Code, inasmuch as the 
provisions of section 5537 of the Business and Professions 
Code expressly permit a contract between an unlicensed archi-
tect and client upon the former's disclosure that he is 
unlicensed. 
We are dealing here with a code section (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 5537) enacted by the Legislature and a regulation adopted 
by an administrative agency pursuant to enabling legislation. 
The fact that this regulation appears within the California 
Administrative Code does not raise the regulation to the 
comparable status of a code section passed by the Legislature 
since the "Administrative Code" is not a code as such but 
only the conglomeration of all the rules and regulations 
adopted by state agencies and filed with the secretary of state 
(Gov. Code, § 11370 et seq.). Where on one hand there is a 
law passed by the Legislature under its general police power, 
and on the other hand a regulation adopted by a state agency, 
laws enacted by the T.1egislature will prevail over regulations 
made by the administrative agency with regard to matters 
which are not exclusively that agency's affairs (see Tolman v. 
Underhill, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712 [249 P.2d 280]; Wilson v. 
762 C.2d 
Beville, 47 Cal.2d 
caise v. California Emp. 56 Cal.App.2d 554 [133 
P.2d 47]; Hamblin v. State Per·sonnel Board, 148 Cal.App.2d 
53, 55 [306 P.2d 118] ; cf., Hirschman v. County of Los 
Angeles, 39 Cal.2d 703 P.2d 287, 250 P.2d 145]). 
To determine whether or not the has undertaken 
to occupy a field of on 
an analysis of the statute and a consideration of the facts 
and circumstances on which it was intended to operate (see 
Tolman v. S1tpra, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712). Moreover 
where the has enacted statutes governing a par-
ticular subject matter, its intent to oceupy the field preempt-
ing other regulations is not to be measured by the language 
alone but by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative 
seheme (see Tolnwn v. Underhill, supra, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712). 
It is clear that the Legislature of California has attempted 
to regulate the practice of architecture in this state. It has 
seen fit to require an architect desiring to practice here to 
obtain a license and his failure to do so is a misdemeanor 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 5586). However, it has also written 
an exemption into this licensing requirement in section 5537, 
by which an architect may practice even though unlicensed, 
if he makes a written disclosure to his client of the fact he 
is unlicensed. The determinative question before us is whether 
this exemption is intended by the Legislature to occupy 
exclusively the matters of architectural licensing. The major-
ity answers this question by stating that "It [Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 5537] docs not confer upon all persons for all purposes 
the right to design buildings in this state.'' This answer would 
appear to beg the question, but in addition it is inadequate 
for the reason that there is no attempt to explore the situations 
and conditions upon which section 5537 is intended to oper-
ate, as is required by the principles heretofore stated. 
Section 5537 of the Business and Professions Code permits 
an unlicensed person to perform services constituting the 
practice of architecture if he gives written notice that he is 
not an architect. The policy underlying this section has been 
stated to be the prevention of unlicensed persons from prepar-
ing plans and specifications unless the client knows and is 
informed that such person is unlicensed. (W. M. Ballard 
Corp. v. Dougherty, 106 CaJ.App.2d 35, 41 [234 P.2d 745].) 
In more concrete terms the statutory notice is provided for the 
benefit of the owner merely to place him on his guard as to 
whether or not he wishes to employ an uncertified person 
CHALMERS 763 
224, 226 [288 P. 
11 ) . 
It is clear from the cases that the exemption provisions of 
s;eetion 5f537 are intended to operate for the benefit of all 
owners. There is no to restrict the exemption to 
owners and exclude others; the statute its terms 
all 
However this statement of 
auc! not conclusive on 
field of architecture """"'""·"' 
sary. 
policy is too uncertain 
of intent to occupy the 
further analysis is neces-
The key to the ascertainment of the legislative intent is 
found in the reason for creating such an exemption. The 
most obvious reason, and the one I believe makes sense, is to 
enable the citizens of California to have access to architects 
licensed in other states but who are unlicensed in this state. 
This exemption, when so interpreted, recognizes the indi-
vidualistic disposition of an architect and the attempts archi-
tects make to preserve the integrity of their individual expres-
sion. In other words if a citizen of California admires the 
work of a New York architect and wishes to employ him he 
may do so, and the architect in turn would be able to work 
unfettered by any associatio11 with California architects, pre-
serving the individuality of his work. It is clear that without 
snch exemption a California citizen could only employ a non-
resident unlicensed architect where the latter would be re-
quired to work with a certified California architect, and 
this could well be an unacceptable condition to an architect 
who plaees the individual nature of his work in a paramount 
position. The exemption appears to be realistic in that the 
Legislature recognized the desirability of permitting archi-
tects from other states, and indeed other countries, to prac-
tice in California in a manner by which they can express 
their individual ideas unimpeded by others. Therefore, in its 
broader aspects the exemption is an attempt by the Legislature 
to eliminate provincialism in architecture. 
To be successful this attempt must be exclusive and not 
subject to exceptions. If the Department of Public Health 
is permitted to deal with the licensing of architects, then 
logically other administrative agencies may likewise carve 
out exceptions subject only to constitutional limitations. But 
if this were permitted the reason for allowing unlicensed 
architects to practice in California would be defeated. Thus, 
764 SIGNAL On. ETC. Co. v. AsHLAND OIL ETc. Co. C.2d 
in order to effectuate the reasons behind section its appli-
cation must be deemed and any regulation that 
this application must Tolrnan v. Under-
hill, supra, 39 CaL2d 708.) 
'l'his conclusion does not undermine the Department of 
Public Health in their over since all plans 
for must be submitted to them and disapproved if 
are defective CaL Admin. Code 406). Moreover, the 
department may even though the architect 
submitting them is licensed in California. So, in fact, whether 
or not a person is licensed is immaterial to the approval or 
disapproval. It is further evident that there is no more assur-
ance that an architect licensed by the State of California will 
be any more able to submit plans for a hospital than 
a licensed architect from any other Ntate. Any assumption 
to the contrary appears to the provincialism that 
section 5537 was designed to avoid. 
For the reasons above stated it would appear that the con-
tract here involved is valid under section 5537 of the Business 
and Professions Code, and plaintiff is therefore entitled to 
recover damages for its breach. 
I would therefore affirm the judgment. 
[S. F. No.19329. In Bank. Feb. 25, 1958.J 
SIGNAL OIL AND GAS COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., 
Respondents, v. ASHLAND OIL AND REFINING 
COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Appellants. 
[1] Corporations-Stockholders' Meetings-Voting Agreements.-
The validity of an agents' agreement entered into by some 
stockholders of a corporation incorporated in ~mother state is 
governed by the law of that state, and a decision of its highest 
court that such agreement is void as an illegal voting trust is, 
on principles of full faith and credit (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1), 
binding on the Supreme Court of California. 
[lJ Validity of voting trust or other similar agreement for 
control of voting power of corporate stock, note, 105 A.L.R. 123. 
See also Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 246; Am.Jur., Corporations, 
§ 500 et seq. 
M:cK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4] Corporations,§ 392; [3] Injunc-
tions, § 93; [5, 7, 10] Injunctions, § 48; [6, 8) Judgments, § 347; 
[9] Courts, § 10; [11] Corporations, § 716; [121 14] Injunctions, § 74(2); [13, 15-18] Corporations, § 566. 
